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This short statement has three aims. First, it suggests that rules and institutions 
are a convenient and productive entrypoint for analysing capitalism and 
mainstream proposals for its reform. But it also suggests that analyses cannot 
stop there if adequate critiques and alternative strategies are to be developed. 
Above all we need to move beyond rules and institutions to examine the micro-
foundations of institutions in particular subjectivities, cognitive frames, modes 
of calculation, norms of conduct, and forms of embodiment; and to study the 
macro-contexts that emerge from interaction among institutions and shape this 
interaction in a complex dialectic of path-shaping and path-dependency. It also 
suggests how to move beyond rules and institutions. Second, this statement 
proposes a distinctive theoretical approach based on a combination of trans- and 
post-disciplinary modes of inquiry. It argues that these can inform both our 
collective intellectual endeavours and also provide the basis for a critical 
popular pedagogy. And, third, it identifies some key issues for a research 
agenda on the political and ethical dimensions of contemporary economic 
activities. 
In the spirit of the PEKEA project, our statement is not concerned to 
provide yet another critique of orthodox economics (for which, see Hodgson 
1989; North 1990; Rutherford 1994). Instead we emphasize the socially 
embedded, socially regularized nature of market economies and address 
changing economic norms and modes of calculation. This leads us to approach 
capitalism very broadly in terms of the overall ensemble of socially embedded, 
socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social 
forces and actions that are involved in sustaining the wage-relation, a labour 
process and more general system of production organized in terms of profit-
and-loss, and a complex balance between competition and cooperation among 
different capitals. Seen in these terms capitalist relations of production are not 
just economic but is also (always, necessarily) extra-economic. In pursuing 
these ideas should help to provide a clearer account of the inherently political 
aspects of contemporary capitalism. 
 
 
Institutions and Rules 
 
Institutionalists differ widely in how they define institutions and the respects in 
which they matter. In part this reflects different disciplinary traditions and 'the 
inclination to opt for a discipline-based, theory-impregnated internalist-style 
definition of the term' that makes most sense from a given disciplinary 
perspective (Goodin, 1996: 21). In general the social science literature tends to 
regard institutions as social practices that are regularly and continuously 
repeated, linked to defined roles and social relations, sanctioned and maintained 
by social norms, and highly significant in the overall social structure. Examples 
of institutions in this sense include the family, religion, property, markets, the 
state, education, sport, and medicine. As such they are linked to particular 
emergent rules of conduct and modes of calculation as well as to emergent 
structural qualities and feedback effects. Institutions thus defined should not be 
mistaken for their instantiation in particular cases nor confused with particular 
organizations. Thus, to take the list above, individual families, church 
congregations, commodities, economic transactions, cabinets, schools, athletic 
competitions, or hospitals would not count as institutions. Some theorists adopt 
an intermediate position that treats some organizations as institutions insofar as 
they are durable, perform official, public, or quasi-public activities, and have a 
major impact on the wider society. Examples of such 'institutions' include the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; the peak 
organizations of capital and labour; established churches or other religious 
faiths; the leading parties in a competitive party system; major mass media 
organizations; and even some firms or banks that have a key role in economic 
performance and are considered 'too big or important to fail'. These are certainly 
important objects of inquiry and deserve inclusion in the sort of inquiry 
recommended here. In particular, the institutional economics of organization is 
one of the main fields of the new institutional economics (e.g., Rowlinson 1999; 
Scott 1995; Williamson 1996). We are less convinced that they should be called 
'institutions', however, as opposed to being analyzed from an institutionalist 
perspective. We would therefore reserve the notion of institution for 
supraorganizational institutions. But this is simply an issue of definitional fiat 
and our overall analysis would still stand even if we accepted some other 
terminological conventions. There is also considerable disagreement about the 
nature of rationality, rules, and conduct. In contrast to the strong conception of 
rationality (the formal maximizing behaviour of rational calculating subjects) 
favored in orthodox economics, we adopt a weak conception more suited to the 
analysis of variable institutional contexts characterized by different cognitive 
frames, bounded rationalities, logics of appropriateness, conventions, modes of 
calculation, and so on. Moreover, given our greater interest in real economic 
activities than rational choice modelling, we define rules as explicit and/or 
implicit conventions and norms of conduct that variously prescribe, proscribe, 
encourage, permit, or derogate certain patterns of behaviour in more or less 
well-defined circumstances. This points in turn to the need to investigate the 
conditions under which such rules emerge, the factors behind their variation, the 
extent to which they are acted upon (and the various reasons that might prompt 
economic agents to conform with them) and their stability. 
Institutions are closely linked to sets of rules and norms of conduct both 
through explicit attempts at institutional design and through unintended 
evolutionary stabilization. Institutional design requires attention to conduct as 
well as structure. For institutions are typically associated with specific logics of 
appropriateness that are irreducible to formal rationality. Instead they specify 
more or less specific and substantive rules of conduct. Stable institutions 
typically emerge through the co-evolution of (a) changing rules of conduct and 
the strategies and tactics that they permit and (b) the selection and 
reinforcement of these rules, strategies and tactics in and through the reward 
structures (pay-offs) associated with specific institutional ensembles. This 
highlights the importance of studying the interaction between social agents and 
institutions in terms of the structurally-mediated recursive selection of strategies 
and tactics and the reflexively-mediated reorganization of specific structural 
configurations. This implies that institutional design and reproduction depend 
not only on appropriate sets of norms but also on the creation of subjects able 
and willing to interpret them in ways that sustain these institutions. Creating 
such subjects involves more than a cognitive and normative socialization that 
enables individuals to conform quasi-mechanically with reproduction 
requirements of specific institutions. For particular roles and identities and 
particular skilled subjects need to be discursively constituted, embedded in 
appropriate institutions and material practices, and materialized in specific 
human competencies. Conversely, because institutions are never completely and 
rigidly institutionalized and rules are always partly indeterminate, their 
reproduction requires active engagement and flexibility on the part of agents. 
This is where 'logics of appropriateness' enter the picture, especially when they 
encourage social forces to make appropriate decisions in response to changing 
circumstances.  
Our main purpose in this section has been to stress the heuristic value of 
studying rules and institutions. For this has a useful mediating role in relation to 
well-established and troublesome ontological antinomies, epistemological 
dualisms, and methodological dilemmas in the social sciences (for a discussion 
of these, see Jessop 2001). We can illustrate this general claim with the path-
dependency and path shaping. As emergent meso-level phenomena situated at 
the intersection of path-dependent structural inertia and path-shaping activities, 
institutions provide a theoretical and empirical bridge between macro- and 
micro-phenomena or macro-social logics and micro-social foundations. Because 
institutions always need to be interpreted and re-negotiated, they can never fully 
determine action; but nor do they permit any action whatsoever so that life is no 
more than the product of purely wilful contingency. Thus institutions typically 
entail a more or less tightly constrained set of feasible current choices. Within 
these constraints, however, social forces may (and often must) choose how to 
act; and, in acting strategically over different spatio-temporal horizons, they 
may be able to eliminate current constraints and modify future possibilities. In 
this way path-shaping activities can create new forms of discursively and 





This institutionalist research agenda requires new intellectual practices. We will 
illustrate this from the critique of political economy. Classical political 
economy was a pre-disciplinary field of inquiry in the sense that it was formed 
before academic disciplines crystallized out and began to fragment knowledge 
in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. As such it was pioneered by polymaths 
who believed that political economy should comprise the integrated study of 
economic organization and wealth creation, good government and good 
governance, and moral economy (including language, culture, and ethical 
issues). More orthodox forms of political economy had already begun the retreat 
from these wide-ranging concerns in the early nineteenth-century; and pure 
economics as a distinct discipline degenerated further as it became increasingly 
rigorous (mathematical and formal) at the expense of its relevance to the real 
world. We cannot return to the pre-disciplinary era but we can hope to develop 
pluri-, trans-, or post-disciplinary analyses of economic activities by drawing on 
the expertise of colleagues from different disciplines and research traditions as 
well as by developing new concepts and methodologies that seek to transcend 
disciplinary boundaries. A pluri- or inter-disciplinary approach typically 
combines what are regarded as the inherently valid understandings and 
knowledge of different disciplines to produce the 'big picture' through 'joined up 
thinking'. Whilst this is a useful starting point for analysing complex problems, 
it is better still to aim to adopt trans- and/or post-disciplinary approaches. These 
begin by identifying specific problems and then mobilize, develop, and integrate 
the necessary concepts and knowledge without regard to disciplinary 
boundaries. To go beyond trans-disciplinarity to post-disciplinarity requires a 
final set of difficult intellectual and practical steps. This is to recognize the 
conventional nature and inherent limitations of individual disciplines and 
disciplinarity as a whole and to remain open to new ideas that may well be 
inconsistent or incommensurable with any or all established disciplines. This 
commitment to post-disciplinarity is a counsel of perfection, however, and 
presents us with a constantly moving target as disciplines and their relations are 
reorganized. Transdisciplinarity is often sufficient for many purposes and it is 
almost certainly easier to deliver in an age when established disciplines still 
dominate higher education and the intellectual division of labour. 
To clarify these points we now distinguish forms of disciplinarity, 
indicating how they affect the study of economic rules and institutions, and 
noting their implications for a political and ethical critique of economic 
activities (see Figure 1). Pre-disciplinary analyses of the economy are 
associated with the early modern period of Western thought, when the market 
economy was not yet fully differentiated from other societal spheres and when, 
in particular, the commodity form had not been fully extended to labour-power.  
Consequently, classical political economy was typically grounded in relatively 
rich philosophical anthropologies (i.e., sets of assumptions about human nature 
and its development) and linked to relatively explicit ethico-political 
considerations. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that more specialized 
disciplines emerged, corresponding to the greater degree of functional 
differentiation of modern societies occurring during this period and to struggles 
to establish a hierarchized division of mental labour within a growing academic 
and technocratic community. These more specialized disciplines (including, of 
course, economics) have often rejected philosophical anthropology as 
premodern, unscientific, or overtly normative and/or tend to work with 
attenuated assumptions about functionally-specific rationalities (modes of 
calculation) or logics of appropriateness that provide no real basis for a more 
general critique of contemporary societies.  
We cannot return to a pre-disciplinary age but this does not require us to 
think and act on terms set by mainstream disciplines. A narrow disciplinary 
approach to economic analysis would focus exclusively on themes that are 
identified in terms of vulgar political economy and its subsequent development 
as a specialized, mathematized discipline concerned with economizing 
behaviour. It would also correspond to the naïve, positivist belief that the 
market economy exists and can be studied in isolation from other spheres of 
social relations. This naturalization of the economy is linked to top-down 
pedagogic practices that reproduce an unreflecting and fetishistic approach to 
the laws of the market and the basic tendencies of the market economy. It also 
neglects the ethico-political dimensions of the economic field. Pluri-, trans-, and 
post-disciplinary approaches each overcome these problems to a greater extent. 
In particular, post-disciplinary approaches reject the legitimacy of established 
disciplinary boundaries and adopt a more problem-oriented approach. They 
therefore tend to be more open-textured, more eclectic, and more interested in 
political and ethical issues. This leads to more critical pedagogic practices in the 
academic and everyday worlds that involve a commitment to dialogue and 
mutual learning rather than ex cathedra instruction and top-down planning.  
This commitment to dialogue is already evident within the institutionalist 
movement itself (for a discussion of different institutionalisms, Hall and Taylor 
1996; Jessop 2001; Nielsen 2001; Peters 2000). Thus, as diMaggio (1998) 
notes, different institutionalisms have already moved from 'mutual 
disengagement' through constructive criticism to mutual dialogue. This is 
intended to build bridges between disciplines that have hitherto tended to favour 
different forms of institutionalism and to enhance their overall power (cf. 
Campbell and Pedersen 2001). There is also growing recognition that many key 
issues actually demand pluri-, trans-, or post-disciplinary approaches that 
operate across established disciplinary boundaries. These include social capital, 
trust, knowledge, learning, uncertainty, risk, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
systemic or structural competitiveness, governance and metagovernance, 
network economies, organizational dynamics, the economic performance and 
social profiles of different models of capitalism, social exclusion, and 
underdevelopment. For these phenomena have closely linked economic and 
extra-economic dimensions and also raise central issues of structure and agency.  
 
Key Issues for a Research Agenda on Rules and Institutions  
 
We can now move towards a research agenda congruent with PEKEA's 
purposes. We would raise the following key issues: 
 
(1) Rules and institutions are an excellent entrypoint into the political and 
ethical aspects of economic activities. The ongoing co-evolution of the 
economic and extra-economic dimensions of these activities is mediated 
through specific institutional configurations and specific subjectivities. The 
economy can no longer be understood in terms of the market-mediated 
equilibration of rational economic actions in a hermetically-sealed economic 
system. The improbable reproduction of capitalism always depends on a 
complex, unstable, and contested set of extra-economic as well as economic 
institutions, rules, and practices. This highlights the inevitably political 
character of the economy – both in the narrow sense of its interpenetration with 
the political system and in the broad sense of its shaping in and through wide-
ranging struggles. Likewise, notwithstanding the mystique of homo 
economicus, economic rationality requires the continual making and remaking, 
enculturation and embodiment, of economic subjects. This reveals the crucial 
but hidden ethical dimensions to economic life as well as the scope (and 
necessity) for creating and empowering different types of economic subject. In 
this way focusing on rules and institutions serves to highlight the role of ethical 
reflection on proposals to reform/transform economies and suggests that it 
might be fruitful to revive philosophical anthropology to rethink ethical issues. 
 
(2) A focus on rules and institutions also helps to avoid voluntarism and 
structuralism. The temptation of voluntarism is to believe that it is enough to 
identify a feasible alternative for people of good will to accept its 
appropriateness and desirability and cooperate in its realization. This leads to 
neglect of the path-dependent constraints on social action and, in particular, the 
inertia associated with the long-term reproduction of institutions. In short, it 
oversimplifies the problem of how we get from here to there. The temptation of 
structuralism is to believe that institutional longevity excludes change so that 
we cannot move from here to there. We have suggested that this problem is 
best addressed in terms of a dialectic of path-dependency and path-shaping. 
Path-dependency implies that an institution's prior development shapes current 
and future trajectories so that institutional legacies limit current possibilities in 
institutional innovation. History makes a difference. But this need not imply 
fatalism. For social forces could intervene in current conjunctures and actively 
re-articulate them so that new trajectories become possible. This is especially 
significant when linked to social actors' capacities for reflexivity, i.e., second-
order observation of their situation, actions, and their actions' repercussions on 
their identities and interests. Overall, then, this dialectic indicates the 
significance of reflexively reorganized spatio-temporal matrices and 
recursively selected strategies and tactics. 
 
(3) Durable institutions always require micro-foundations and usually exist in 
specific macro-contexts. They are sustained and instantiated in individual, 
organizational, and interorganizational activities and embedded in functionally 
differentiated institutional orders in a complex, decentred, and increasingly 
global society. Rules of conduct are tied to the formation of subjectivities and 
'normalizing' processes that enable subjects to learn and enact logics of 
appropriateness in different institutional contexts. Established rules are also 
transformed, sometimes with major path-shaping effects, as individuals, 
groups, and other social forces reinterpret, resist, or overturn them. It follows 
that an institutional analysis cannot be confined to rules and institutions if it is 
to fully comprehend them – there is always something beyond institutions that 
must be analysed and taken into account when seeking to transform them. 
 
(4) Given the interpenetration and overdetermination of the economic and 
extra-economic, the market economy is also a moral economy, social economy, 
political economy, cultural economy, legal economy, and so on. This indicates 
the need for pluri-, trans-, and post-disciplinary approaches to develop the 
appropriate tools to study this multifaceted economy in all its economic and 
extra-economic complexity. A problem-oriented, project-mediated pedagogy 
and problem-oriented, post-disciplinary research are therefore called for. 
 
(5) Finally, given the interpenetration and overdetermination of the economic 
and extra-economic and the inevitably social nature of the economy, it follows 
that space is opened to discuss how we want to socially construct the economy 
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Adam Smith, G.W. 
Hegel, Henri 
Rousseau, Karl 
Marx, Max Weber 
Disciplinary Focus exclusively 
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ignore all other 
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Adopt an approach 
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a given discipline 
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Post-1990 North 
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Figure 1. Outline of different forms of disciplinarity 
